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Abstract — We consider the problem of access privilege management in a classical protection 
environment featuring subjects attempting to access the protected objects. We express an access 
privilege in terms of an access right and a privilege level. The privilege level and a protection 
diagram associated with each given object determine whether a nominal access privilege for 
this object corresponds to an effective, possibly weaker access privilege, or is revoked. We 
associate a password system with each object; the password system takes the form of a hierar-
chical bidimensional one-way chain. A subject possesses a nominal access privilege for a given 
object if it holds a key that matches one of the passwords in the password system of this object; 
the protection diagram determines the extent of the corresponding effective access privilege. 
The resulting protection environment has several interesting properties. A key reduction mech-
anism allows a subject that holds a key for a given object to distribute keys for weaker access 
rights at lower privilege levels. A subject that owns a given object can review or revoke the 
passwords for this object by simply modifying the protection diagram. The memory require-
ments to represent a protection diagram are negligible; as far as password storage is concerned, 
space-time trade-offs are possible. 
Keywords: access privilege, one-way chain, one-way function, password, review, revocation. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In a classical protection model, active entities, called subjects, attempt to access passive 
entities, the protected objects [20]. Objects are typed, and the type of a given object states the 
set of values that the object can assume, the set of the operations that can be applied to these 
values, and a set of access rights; for each operation, the definition of the object type states the 
access right that is necessary to execute that operation successfully. 
1.1. Access privilege specification 
In a system of this type, a basic problem is to specify the relations existing between subjects 
and protected objects by defining the access rights that each subject holds on the objects [21]. 
A classical solution is based on the concept of a capability [12]Levy. This is a pair (G, AR), 
where G is the name of an object and AR is an access privilege expressed in terms of a set of 
access rights. A subject that holds capability (G, AR) can access object G to perform the oper-
ations permitted by the access rights in AR.  
Capabilities should be segregated in memory, so that their internal representation is inac-
cessible to subjects [3]. This is necessary to prevent a subject from tampering with an existing 
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capability to amplify the access rights it contains, or even forging a capability from scratch. 
Several solutions have been devised to the capability segregation problem. Special memory 
segments, which we shall call the capability segments, can be reserved for capability storage 
(in contrast, data segments will be reserved for storage of ordinary information items) [4], [9], 
[23]. This solution leads to segment proliferation. The resulting programming paradigm is often 
unnatural, e.g. the representation of a data structure must include a capability segment storing 
the capabilities for the data segments. Alternatively, capability segregation can be obtained by 
taking advantage of a tagged memory system that associates a 1-bit tag with each memory cell; 
the value of the tag of a given cell indicates whether this cell contains a capability or an ordinary 
information item [7], [18]. In this approach, the instruction set of the processor includes special 
instructions for capability processing; if one of these instructions is executed on a memory cell 
tagged to contain an ordinary information item, an exception of violated protection is raised 
and execution fails. Contrary to hardware standardization [16], ad-hoc memory modules are 
necessary to support cell tags (e.g. a 65-bit cell is used to store a 64-bit memory word). 
In a different approach, a set of passwords is associated with each protected object, and 
each password corresponds to a subset of all access rights [1], [2], [6], [15], [19]. In order to 
access an object to perform a given operation, a subject presents a key for this object. The access 
is successful only if the key matches one of the passwords associated with the object, and this 
password includes the access right required by that operation; if this is not the case, an exception 
of violated protection is raised and the object access fails. 
Keys are protected from forging by the password size; if passwords are large, the probabil-
ity of guessing a valid key is vanishingly low. It follows that keys do not need to be segregated 
in memory; instead, they can be freely mixed with ordinary data. This simplifies software com-
position in memory. Furthermore, no need for special hardware is connected with the necessity 
to store cell tags. 
1.2. Access right distribution 
A subject S that holds a set of access rights for a given object G should be in a position to 
distribute these access rights, in full or in part, to other subjects. In a capability environment, a 
result of this type is obtained by a simple action of a capability copy (and indeed, simplicity in 
access right distribution was one of the original motivations for the introduction of the capabil-
ity concept [12]).  
In a password-based protection system, subject S that possesses a key k for object G can 
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distribute the access privilege corresponding to this key to another subject by simply transmit-
ting a copy of the key. A related problem is that of key reduction. Subject S should be given the 
ability to transmit only a subset of the access rights corresponding to key k. This means that a 
mechanism of the protection system should allow S to convert k into a weaker key k’. The key 
reduction problem can be easily solved by associating an object manager with each given ob-
ject. In a situation of this type, subject S transmits key k to the object manager that verifies the 
validity of k and then generates a key k’ matching a weaker password; k’ is returned to S. Of 
course, the presence of an object manager tends to complicate the overall object structure, and 
is contrary to a main requirement of a protection system design, i.e. simplicity in access right 
management. 
1.3. Access right review and revocation 
A subject that granted an access privilege to another subject should be allowed to revise 
the grant and revoke the access privilege from the recipient. Revocation should extend to all 
the subjects that received the privilege being revoked from the first recipient, recursively. Rev-
ocation should be reversible, so that after a given access privilege has been revoked, it should 
be possible to confirm this access privilege and restore its validity. 
Several solutions to the revocation problem have been proposed with reference to capabil-
ity-based protection environments [14]. These include a reference monitor associated with the 
given object that manages the access permissions held by all subjects on this object [17], [22]; 
a propagation graph for each capability that keeps track of all successive transferals of this 
capability throughout the system [5]; and short-lived capabilities, whose validity must be re-
newed periodically, and are implicitly revoked if renewal is lacking [11]. These solutions tend 
to subvert the main advantage of the capability-based protection model, i.e. simplicity in access 
right transmission between subjects [13].  
In a password-based protection environment, a subject that receives a key is free to transmit 
this key further, and this key diffusion process may well extend to any transition depth. This 
means that access rights tend to propagate throughout the system. A simple solution to the rev-
ocation problem is to modify one or more passwords associated with the given object, so that 
the corresponding keys lose their validity. This solution does not meet the requirement to limit 
revocation to a subset of the access rights associated with the given password. 
This paper presents a model of a password management system that has been designed by 
taking the following requirements into account:  
• A simple mechanism for access privilege distribution should permit effective forms of key 
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reduction, so that a subject that holds a given access privilege can transmit this privilege 
only in part.  
• Password review and revocation should be fully supported, so that the extent of a given 
password can be restricted to a subset of the original access rights. The consequence of a 
password review should extend to all keys matching the reviewed password. It should be 
possible to revert the effect of a password review and restore full password validity. 
• The memory requirements for storage of the passwords and the information items related 
to password management should be kept to a minimum. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our protection model with 
special reference to access privileges and passwords. The concept of a protection diagram is 
introduced expressing a relation between the nominal access privilege connected with a pass-
word and the effective access privilege granted by possession of a key matching that password. 
Section 3 presents the password system with special reference to password generation and man-
agement. Section 4 discusses the protection model from a number of salient viewpoints, which 
include the verification, review and revocation of access rights, and the memory requirements 
for storage of the passwords and the protection diagram. Section 5 gives concluding remarks. 
2. THE PROTECTION MODEL 
Let T be an object type, and let op0, op1, … be the operations that can be applied to the 
objects of type T. Furthermore, let ar0, ar1, …, arr-1 be the access rights, and let pl0, pl1, …, plc-1 
be the privilege levels defined by T, where quantities r and c are specific to T. Privilege levels 
are involved in password validation, review and revocation, as will be illustrated shortly.  
The access rights are ordered from the weakest ar0 to the strongest arr-1. Possession of 
access right ari implies possession of every weaker access right ari’, i’ < i. Similarly, the privi-
lege levels are ordered from the lowest pl0 to the highest plc-1.  
An access privilege for an object G of type T is the specification of an access right and a 
privilege level. Let Pnom = (ari, plj), 0 ≤ i ≤ r – 1, 0 ≤ j ≤ c – 1, be a nominal access privilege 
expressed in terms of access right ari and privilege level plj. Pnom grants its holder an effective 
access privilege Peff = (ar*, plj) expressed in terms of access right ar* and the same privilege 
level plj, where ar* is not stronger than ari. The actual extent of ar* is stated for object G by a 
relation existing between the access rights and the privilege levels. This relation is specific to 
G, and is expressed by a diagram, which is associated with G and is called the protection dia-
gram of G. 
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The protection diagram is defined in a two-dimensional Cartesian coordinate system. In 
the protection diagram, the horizontal axis refers to the access rights, from ar0 to arr-1, and the 
vertical axis refers to the privilege levels, from pl0 to plc-1. The protection line is a polygonal 
chain whose vertices are access privileges that we call the limit privileges, with the constraint 
that at least one limit privilege must be associated with each access right. Figure 1 shows ex-
amples of protection diagrams featuring four access rights, ar0 to ar3, and five privilege levels, 
pl0 to pl4. The protection line divides the protection diagram into two regions: a validity region 
that includes the protection line and corresponds to higher privilege levels, and a downgrade 
region that corresponds to lower privilege levels. 
In the example of Figure 1a, the limit privileges are (ar0, pl1), (ar1, pl2), (ar2, pl2), and (ar3, 
pl4). The protection line connects the corresponding points of the protection diagram. The va-
lidity region occupies the upper-left part of the diagram and includes the protection line; the 
downgrade region occupies the lower-right part. In Figure 1b, the limit privileges are (ar0, pl4), 
(ar1, pl3), (ar1, pl2), (ar2, pl2), and (ar3, pl1). The validity region occupies the upper-right part 
 
Figure 1. Protection diagrams featuring four access rights and five privilege levels, in a variety of configurations 
of the protection line. 
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of the diagram and includes the protection line; the downgrade region occupies the lower-left 
part. In Figure 1c, the protection line is horizontal and connects limit privileges (ar0, pl4), (ar1, 
pl4), (ar2, pl4), and (ar3, pl4). The validity region degenerates into the protection line. Finally, 
in Figure 1d the protection line is horizontal and connects limit privileges (ar0, pl0), (ar1, pl0), 
(ar2, pl0), and (ar3, pl0). In this case, the validity region occupies the whole protection diagram. 
For the given nominal access privilege, the protection line and the two protection regions 
determine the corresponding effective privilege. Let us refer again to nominal privilege Pnom = 
(ari, plj) and the corresponding effective privilege Peff = (ar*, plj). If Pnom is in the validity region 
(including the protection line), nominal access right ari is effective, that is, ar* = ari and con-
sequently Peff = Pnom; a subject S that possesses Pnom is granted access right ari. If Pnom is in the 
downgrade region, access right ari is downgraded to the strongest access right ar* at protection 
level plj that is weaker than ari and is included in the validity region. If ari cannot be down-
graded into the validity region, then access privilege Pnom grants no access right at all; in a 
situation of this type, we say that Pnom is revoked. 
In the example of Figure 1a, nominal access privilege (ar1, pl3) is in the validity region, 
and is effective; a subject that possesses this access privilege is granted access right ar1. Nom-
inal privilege (ar3, pl3) is in the downgrade region, and the corresponding effective privilege is 
(ar2, pl3); a subject that possesses (ar3, pl3) is granted access right ar2. Similarly, nominal priv-
ilege (ar2, pl1) is in the downgrade region, and the corresponding effective privilege is (ar0, pl1). 
Finally, nominal privilege (ar1, pl0) is in the downgrade region and cannot be downgraded into 
the validity region, so it is revoked (this access privilege grants no access right at all). In the 
example of Figure 1b, nominal privileges (ar3, pl3) and (ar3, pl1) are in the validity region, and 
are effective. Nominal privilege (ar1, pl1) cannot be downgraded into the validity region, and is 
revoked. In the example of Figure 1c, all nominal privileges are revoked except those defined 
in terms of the highest privilege level, pl4, which are effective. Finally, in the example of Figure 
1d, the validity region occupies the entire protection diagram, so all nominal privileges are 
effective. 
In every given object type, the strongest access right arr-1 is called the own access right; 
possession of this access right for a given object makes it possible to delete the object and to 
modify its protection line (that is, to modify the position of the limit privileges in the protection 
diagram). Access privilege (arr-1, plc-1) corresponding to the own access right at the highest 
privilege level is called the owner privilege. A subject that creates a new object (the object 
owner) is granted the owner privilege for this object. When an object is created, a protection 
diagram is associated with that object, and the shape of the protection line is determined as part 
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of the object initialization.  
An important property is that, in the protection diagram, all privileges at privilege level 
plc-1 are always in the validity region; it follows that the owner privilege is always effective. 
Consequently, a subject that creates an object is always in a position to delete this object and to 
modify its protection line; as will be shown shortly, an action of this type corresponds to a form 
of review or revocation of access privileges.  
3. THE PASSWORD SYSTEM 
Let us refer again to type T, where ar0, ar1, …, arr-1 are the access rights, pl0, pl1, …, plc-1 
are the privilege levels, and Pnom = (ari, plj), 0 ≤ i ≤ r – 1, 0 ≤ j ≤ c – 1, are the nominal access 
privileges. We shall refer to the generic operation op defined by T, arop being the access right 
necessary to execute this operation successfully. In our protection model, for each object G of 
type T, a password system is associated with G featuring a password for each nominal access 
privilege, for a total of r ∙ c passwords. In order to access G to execute operation op successfully, 
a given subject S must present a key k matching a password in the password system, say pass-
word wi,j. Implementation of operation op includes the actions necessary to determine the ef-
fective access privilege Peff = (ar*, plj) corresponding to the nominal access privilege Pnom = 
(ari, plj) associated with wi,j; to this aim, op uses the protection diagram of G. Execution of 
operation op will terminate successfully only if ar* is stronger than or equal to access right arop; 
if this is not the case, execution terminates with failure. 
A related problem is the generation of the set of passwords for object G. We solve this 
problem by taking advantage of one-way chains. 
3.1. Password generation 
Function F is one-way if it is easy to compute but hard to invert [10]. This means that given 
a value x it is computationally easy to compute F(x), but given a value y it is computationally 
unfeasible to find a value x such that y = F(x). We shall denote i successive applications of F by 
Fi, e.g. F2(x) = F(F(x)). A one-way chain [8] is a collection of values (v0, v1, …, vn-1) such that 
each vi except the last value vn-1 is the result of applying a one-way function F to the next value, 
i.e. vi = F(vi+1) = Fn-1-i(vn-1) for 0 ≤ i < n – 1. Value vn-1 is called the seed of the chain. A hierar-
chical bidimensional one-way chain consists of two levels of chains, where each value of the 
chain at the first level (the primary chain) is the seed of a chain at the second level (a secondary 
chain). 
In our model, the password system of object G of type T is configured as a hierarchical 
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bidimensional one-way chain (Figure 2). To set up the password system, password wr-1,c-1, cor-
responding to owner privilege (arr-1, plc-1), is chosen at random and is the seed of the primary 
chain. A one-way function PF, called the primary function, is used to generate the successive 
passwords in the primary chain, which are associated with access right arr-1 in the direction of 
decreasing privilege levels, i.e. wr-1,c-2 = PF(wr-1,c-1), wr-1,c-3 = PF(wr-1,c-2) = PF2(wr-1,c-1), …, wr-1,0 
= PF(wr-1,1) = PFc-1(wr-1,c-1).  
Each given password wr-1,j of the primary chain is the seed of the secondary chain associ-
ated with the corresponding privilege level, plj. The secondary chain features r values, one value 
for each access right. A further one-way function, the secondary function SF, is used to setup 
the secondary chains, so that for privilege level plj we have wr-2,j = SF(wr-1,j), wr-3,j = SF(wr-2,j) 
= SF2(wr-1,j), …, w0,j = SF(w1,j) = SFr-1(wr-1,j). 
3.2. Password distribution 
As seen in Section 1, the problem of access privilege distribution consists in allowing a 
subject that holds an access privilege for a given object to grant this access privilege to a dif-
ferent subject. A salient feature of password-based protection systems is simplicity in access 
privilege distribution. In a system of this type, a subject S that holds a key k for a given object 
is in a position to distribute the corresponding access privilege to another subject S’, by simply 
transmitting a copy of k to S’.  
In our protection system, subject S may even distribute an access privilege weaker than the 
privilege in the original key. Key reduction is the action of transforming a key for a given access 
privilege into a key for a reduced privilege. Key reduction can take place in the direction of a 
weaker access right, a lower privilege level, or both. Key reduction is obtained by taking ad-
vantage of the structure of the password system and the password chains. In detail:  
w0,c-1 ← ∙∙∙ ← wi,c-1 ← ∙∙∙ ← wr-2,c-1 ← wr-1,c-1 
          ↓ 
w0,c-2 ← ∙∙∙ ← wi,c-2 ← ∙∙∙ ← wr-2,c-2 ← wr-1,c-2 
          ↓ 
          ∙∙∙ 
          ↓ 
w0,j ← ∙∙∙ ← wi,j ← ∙∙∙ ← wr-2,j ← wr-1,j 
          ↓ 
          ∙∙∙ 
          ↓ 
w0,0 ← ∙∙∙ ← wi,0 ← ∙∙∙ ← wr-2,0 ← wr-1,0 
Figure 2. The password system featuring a primary chain whose seed is the password wr-1,c-1 of the owner priv-
ilege, and a secondary chain for each privilege level, whose seed is the corresponding element of the primary 
chain. 
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• A subject that holds key k matching password wr-1,j for access privilege (arr-1, plj) expressed 
in terms of the strongest access right arr-1 and privilege level plj, can derive a key k’ match-
ing password wr-1,j’ for access privilege (arr-1, plj’) expressed in terms of the same access 
right arr-1 and a lower privilege level plj’, j’ < j . To this aim, the subject will apply primary 
one-way function PF iteratively j – j’ times, i.e. k’ = PFj-j’(k). This is a consequence of the 
fact that wr-1,j’ = PFj-j’(wr-1,j).  
• A subject that holds key k matching password wi,j for access privilege (ari, plj) expressed 
in terms of access right ari and privilege level plj can derive a key k’ matching password 
wi’,j for access privilege (ari’, plj) expressed in terms of a weaker access right ari’, i’ < i, 
and the same privilege level plj. To this aim, the subject will apply secondary one-way 
function SF iteratively i – i’ times, i.e. k’ = SFi-i’(k). This is a consequence of the fact that 
wi’,j = SFi-i’(wi,j). 
3.3. Password review and revocation 
As a consequence of the inherent simplicity of key distribution, in a password-based pro-
tection environment access privileges tend to spread throughout the system. A related problem 
is to allow the owner of a given object to control the extent of the effective access privilege 
granted by each password on that object, in contrast with the nominal access privilege corre-
sponding to that password (password review). The object owner should be even in a position to 
revoke the nominal access privilege, so that the password can no longer be used for successful 
object access (password revocation).  
In our design, the object owner can change the position of the limit privileges in the pro-
tection diagram, thereby modifying the protection line and the configuration of the validity 
region and the downgrade region. So doing, the object owner can enforce specific access priv-
ilege management strategies, by reviewing or revoking each given password, independently of 
the subjects that hold this password. In the following, we shall say that a password is effective, 
downgraded or revoked if this is the case for the corresponding nominal access privilege. 
For instance, in the protection diagram of Figure 1d, the protection line is horizontal and is 
placed at privilege level 0. Consequently, all nominal access privileges, and the corresponding 
passwords, are effective. In a situation of this type, a subject that holds a key matching a pass-
word corresponding to a given access privilege can exercise the full access right included in 
this access privilege. By moving the protection line to a high privilege level, e.g. pl4 (see Figure 
1c), the object owner revokes all the passwords corresponding to nominal access privileges at 
lower privilege levels. A subject that holds a key matching one of these passwords cannot use 
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this key for successful object access. If the protection line is that of Figure 1a, high privilege 
levels are necessary to exercise strong access rights. For instance, access privilege (ar3, pl3) is 
below the protection line. This access privilege is downgraded to (ar2, pl3); a subject that holds 
a key matching password w3,3 can use this key to execute a given operation only if this operation 
requires access right ar2 or lower. Finally, if the protection line is configured as shown in Figure 
1b, the access privileges defined in terms of strong access rights are effective even at low priv-
ilege levels, e.g. (ar3, pl1) and the corresponding password w3,1. 
4. DISCUSSION 
4.1. Access right verification 
Let us refer again to object G of type T, let op be an operation defined by T, and let arop be 
the access right required for successful execution of op. The password system of G is stored as 
part of the object internal representation. Now suppose that subject S tries to execute operation 
op on G. To this aim, S presents a key k to op. The actions involved in the execution of op 
include key verification, which will be conceptually structured as follows: 
 Key k is compared with the passwords in the password system of object G. If no matching 
password is found, execution of operation op terminates with failure; otherwise, let wi,j be 
the matching password, and let Pnom = (ari, plj) be the corresponding nominal access privi-
lege, which is expressed in terms of access right ari and privilege level plj. 
 The protection diagram of object G is used to determine whether Pnom is revoked. If this is 
the case, execution of operation op terminates with failure; otherwise, let Peff = (ar*, plj) 
be the effective access privilege corresponding to Pnom. 
 Access right ar* is compared with access right arop (it should be recalled that access rights 
are ordered hierarchically, so that every given access right includes all weaker access 
rights). If ar* < arop, execution of op terminates with failure; otherwise, access right veri-
fication is successful and the actions involved in the execution of op are subsequently ac-
complished. 
4.2. Password review and revocation 
As seen in Section 3.3, in our protection system a subject that owns a given object can 
review or revoke every password defined for that object by simply modifying the shape of the 
protection line. This mechanism results to possess a number of interesting properties: 
• Password review can be limited to a subset of all passwords. This is an inherent property 
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of the protection diagram. For instance, in the protection diagram of Figure 1a, access priv-
ilege (ar3, pl3) is downgraded to (ar2, pl3); this means that password w3,3 grants access right 
ar2 instead of the nominal ar3. In contrast, access privilege (ar1, pl3) is effective, and the 
extent of password w1,3 is unaltered; this password grants access right ar1. 
• Similarly, password revocation can be limited to a subset of all passwords. In the example 
of Figure 1b, all the access privileges in the downgrade region are revoked, and conse-
quently, the corresponding passwords cannot be used for successful object access, e.g. 
password w1,1 corresponding to access privilege (ar1, pl1). On the other hand, the passwords 
for the access privileges in the validity region maintain their access right strength, e.g. 
password w3,3 corresponding to access privilege (ar3, pl3). 
• Two or more passwords corresponding to the same access right at different privilege levels 
can be revoked independently of each other. In the example of Figure 1a, password w1,3 
corresponding to access privilege (ar1, pl3) for access right ar1 at privilege level pl3 is in 
the validity region and is effective, whereas password w1,0 corresponding to access privi-
lege (ar1, pl0) for the same access right ar1 at privilege level pl0 is in the downgrade region 
and is revoked. 
• The effects of a review or revocation are transitive [5], that is, they propagate to all the 
keys matching a given password independently of the subjects that hold these keys and the 
propagation paths followed by the keys to reach these subjects. If a given password is re-
voked or downgraded to a given extent, all keys matching this password are automatically 
revoked or downgraded to the same extent. In fact, a copy of a given key is indistinguish-
able from the original, and keys have no memory of the consecutive copy actions. 
• The effects of a review or revocation are temporal [5], that is, they can be reversed through 
the same mechanism used for the revocation. With reference to Figure 1c, password w2,2 
corresponds to a nominal access privilege in the downgrade region, and is revoked. If the 
protection line is moved to privilege level pl2, for instance, the nominal access privilege 
will be in the validity region, and the validity of w2,2 will be restored to its full extent. 
4.3. Memory requirements 
The protection line 
As seen in Section 2, the shape of the protection line is completely determined by the co-
ordinates of the limit privileges; at least one, and at most two limit privileges correspond to 
each access right (two limit privileges are necessary to delimit a vertical protection line seg-
ment). In a possible representation for up to 16 privilege levels, we shall reserve one byte for 
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each access right. The two 4-bit nibbles of the i-th byte encode the privilege levels of the two 
limit privileges for the i-th access right; if only one limit privilege corresponds to a given access 
right, the two nibbles will specify the same privilege level. 
Let us refer to a protection diagram featuring four access rights, ar0 to ar3, and five privi-
lege levels, pl0 to pl4; in this case, the shape of the protection line can be encoded in 4 bytes. 
Examples are given in Figures 1a to 1d; in these examples, the corresponding hexadecimal 
configurations are 11 22 22 44, 44 32 22 11, 44 44 44 44 and 00 00 00 00, respectively. We 
may conclude that the memory requirements to represent a protection line are negligible. 
Passwords 
The passwords in the password system of a given object will be evaluated when this object 
is initialized. These passwords will be stored in a password array that is part of the internal 
representation of the object. As seen in Section 4.1, the password system is used when an action 
of access right verification takes place, to find the password wi,j matching a given key k. To this 
aim, a sequential search in the password array will check the array elements until the matching 
password is found. The expected number of comparisons is (r ∙ c +1) / 2, r and c being the 
number of access rights and the number of privilege levels, respectively. 
In an alternative approach, a key has the form of a triple (k, i, j), that is, key value k and the 
indexes i and j of the matching password wi,j. In this case, a single comparison is necessary in 
the password array, at element (r ∙ i + j) (here, we hypothesize that passwords are stored in the 
password array by privilege levels); if the value of this element does not match quantity k, key 
verification fails. The memory requirements for storage of quantities i and j are negligible, e.g. 
a single byte for up to 16 access rights and 16 privilege levels. 
If memory is an extremely scarce resource, we shall store a single password instead of the 
entire password system, i.e. password wr-1,c-1 corresponding to the seed of the primary chain 
(see Section 3.1 and Figure 2). In this case, verification of the validity of a given key requires 
recalculation of several passwords, which will be accomplished by using primary one-way 
function PF and secondary one-way function SF. Specifically, we shall use PF to evaluate pass-
words wr-1,c-2, wr-1,c-3, …, to find the seed wr-1,j of the j-th secondary chain; then, we shall use SF 
to evaluate passwords wr-2,j, wr-3,j, …, to find the value of password wi,j. The expected number 
of password evaluations is (c + r) / 2. 
A space-time trade-off is possible, by using the password array to permanently store only 
the passwords wr-1,c-1, wr-1,c-2, …, wr-1,0 that form the primary chain of the password system. In 
this case, verification of the validity of a key matching password wi,j will require recalculation 
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of the first r – i – 1 passwords in the j-th secondary chain, whose seed is password wr-1,j in the 
primary chain. In this case, the expected number of password evaluations decreases to r / 2. 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We have considered the problem of access privilege management in a classical protection 
environment featuring subjects attempting to access the protected objects. We express an access 
privilege in terms of an access right and a privilege level. The privilege level and a protection 
diagram associated with each given object determine whether a nominal access privilege for 
this object corresponds to an effective, possibly weaker access privilege, or is revoked. 
We associate a password system with each object. The password system takes the form of 
a hierarchical bidimensional one-way chain: a primary chain contains the passwords for the 
strongest access right at the different privilege levels; a secondary chain for each privilege level 
contains the passwords for the access rights at that privilege level. A subject possesses a nomi-
nal access privilege for a given object if it holds a key matching one of the passwords in the 
password system of that object; the protection diagram determines the extent of the correspond-
ing effective access privilege.  
The following is a brief summary of the main results we have obtained: 
• A subject that holds a key for a given object is free to distribute this key to other subjects, 
which acquire the corresponding access privilege. A key reduction mechanism allows a 
subject that holds a key for the strongest access right at a given privilege level to distribute 
keys for the same access right or weaker access rights, at the same privilege level or at 
lower privilege levels. Furthermore, a subject that holds a key for an access right which is 
not the strongest access right can distribute keys for weaker access rights at the same priv-
ilege level. 
• A subject that owns a given object can review or even revoke the passwords for this object 
by simply modifying the protection diagram. Review and revocation can be limited to a 
subset of all the passwords. Two or more passwords for the same access right at different 
privilege levels can be revoked independently of each other. We have shown that the effects 
of a password review or revocation are transitive and temporal. 
• The memory requirements to represent a protection diagram are negligible. As far as pass-
word storage is concerned, space-time trade-offs are possible. If we store all the passwords 
of the password system as part of the internal representation of the given object, a single 
comparison is necessary to ascertain the validity of a given key. Alternatively, we can store 
– 14 – 
only the passwords in the primary chain, or even a single password, i.e. the seed of the 
primary chain, at the cost of recalculating several passwords to validate a key. 
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